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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. LAMAR HANSENf ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
CYNTHIA ANN HANSEN, ] 
Defendant and Respondent. ] 
1 Civil No. 860249 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellant herewith submits to this Court the 
following issues for disposition upon this appeal: 
1. Whether Judge Davidson failed to make specific findings 
of fact on the issues of child custodyf child support and payment 
of debts. 
2. Whether the District Court committed error in the 
following respects: 
A. CUSTODY: 
1) In the absence of findings of f ac t , the ruling 
appears to be a r b i t r a r y and not based upon the 
evidence. 
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2) In the absence of findings of fact, the ruling 
appears to not be based upon the "best interests and 
welfare" of the minor child. 
3) The District Court abused its discretion in 
refusing to admit into evidence the Appellant's 
psychological assessment prepared by Dr. Reed Payne. 
4) Based upon the fact that the home study evaluations 
were evenly split on which parent should be awarded 
custody, together with Judge Davidson's inference that 
the evidence in the case was "equal," and particularly 
in light of the fact that findings of fact are 
seriously lacking on the issue of custody, it appears 
that the District Court utilized the outdated "tender 
years" presumption in granting custody of the minor 
child to the Respondent/mother, all in violation of 
constitutional equal protection principles. 
B. CHILD SUPPORT: 
1) In the absence of findings of fact, and in view of 
the applicable child support schedule and the evidence 
concerning the Appellant's income and other child 
support obligations, the ruling appears to be arbitrary 
and not based upon the evidence. 
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C. DIVISION OF DEBTS: 
1) In the absence of findings of factf and in light of 
the fact that the District Court ordered Respondent to 
satisfy the debts which arose due to her criminal 
activity/ it was error for the Judge to order Appellant 
to pay a debt that was incurred to pay Respondent's 
jail bond. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
This is a divorce action instituted by Appellant on or about 
February 13, 1985. The case was tried before Judge Richard C. 
Davidson on March 5, 1986. 
The issues before the Court at trial were child custody, 
visitation and support, division of marital property, and payment 
of marital debts. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before Judge Richard C. Davidson on March 
5, 1986. Judge Davidson made the rulings, among others, which 
are set forth in the "STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL," 
supra. 
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On or about March 10, 1986, Respondent's trial counsel, John 
E. Schindler, filed and served proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
On or about March 24, 1986, Appellant's trial counsel, 
George E. Mangan, filed and served an Objection to the proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
On or about March 31, 1986, Respondent's trial counsel filed 
and served Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Amended Decree of Divorce which in substantial part were non-
responsive to the modifications proposed by George E. Mangan in 
his Objection. 
On or about April 2, 1986, Appellant's trial counsel filed 
and served his withdrawal as Appellant's counsel. 
On or about April 8, 1986, Respondent's trial counsel filed 
and served a Notice [to Appellant] to Appoint Counsel or Appear 
in Person. 
On or about April 14, 1986, and notwithstanding his 
withdrawal, Appellant's trial counsel filed and served a Request 
for Court to Rule on his Objection to the "Proposed Order.11 
On or about April 15, 1986, Judge Davidson by Minute Entry 
ruled that Mr. Mangan's Objection: 
4 
"appears to be moot due to filing of Amended Findings 
of Facts [sic] and Conclusions of law [sic] . Court 
takes note of filing of withdrawal of counsel [of 
George E. Mangan] and notice to appear and no other 
appearance entered, Amended Findings and Decree signed 
April 15, 1986." 
On or about April 1986, the undersigned counsel filed and 
served his Appearance as counsel for the Appellant. 
On or about April 24, 1986, Respondent's trial counsel filed 
and served a Notice of Signing or Entry of Judgment and his 
Withdrawal as counsel for Respondent, and the undersigned counsel 
received copies of the same on or about April 28, 1986. 
On April 28, 1986, trial counsel for both parties had 
withdrawn, and Appellant had contacted the undersigned counsel 
regarding an appeal and at the same time indicated that the 
Amended Decree did not conform with the ruling that Judge 
Davidson had made at trial. Regarding the possible discrepancy 
between Judge Davidson's ruling and the Amended Decree, the 
undersigned counsel did not have any familiarity with the case 
and did not have access to the trial transcript (it had not been 
reduced to writing by the court reporter); otherwise, said 
counsel would have moved the trial court to amend the Amended 
Decree; as it were, said counsel notified Judge Davidson by 
letter dated April 22, 1986 of the possible discrepancy and 
requested the Judge's advice on the matter; receiving no 
direction from the trial court, said counsel proceeded to file a 
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Notice of Appeal for Appellant; once said counsel received a copy 
of the trial transcript, on or about July 14, 1986, counsel 
reasoned that an amendment of the Amended Decree, if appropriate, 
would be resolved by the Supreme Court or by motion to the trial 
court following this appeal. 
On or about May 14, 1986, the undersigned counsel filed a 
Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court, 
On or about May 22, 1986, John E. Schindler filed and served 
his re-appearance in the case for Respondent* 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the judgment of the trial court 
reversed and judgment entered in his favor on the issues of child 
custody, child support and payments of debts, as are more fully 
described in the "STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL," 
supra. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
The parties were married on December 11, 1981, at Elko, 
Nevada. On October 14, 1983, a child was born to the parties and 
named Aron Jim Hansen. 
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RESPONDENT'S CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
Dur ing t h e m a r r i a g e , the Respondent (wife and mother) was 
involved in c r i m i n a l fe lony a c t i v i t y invo lv ing t h e f t , f o r g e r y , 
a l t e r a t i o n of a check, breaking and e n t e r i n g , and p rov id ing f a l s e 
informat ion on a loan a p p l i c a t i o n and she admit ted the same a t 
t r i a l . (Set f o r t h below i s a c h a r t i n d i c a t i n g cr imes for which 
R e s p o n d e n t was c h a r g e d and w h i c h s h e p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o . 
T h e r e a f t e r i s a n o t h e r c h a r t i n d i c a t i n g c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y for 
which Respondent was not charged but in which she admi t t ed he r 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) : 
Charge Cynthia's fiespQnse Date 
Making False Statement Pled Guilty Mar 1982 
on a Loan Application^ 
Employee Theft of Post Pled Guilty Nov 1983 
Office Money Orders2 
Alteration of Check Pled Guilty ? 
(from M & M Oilfield)3 
1
 Tr. at 134. 
2
 Tr. at 135 and 136. 
3
 Tr. at 136. 
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Criminal Activity Cynthia's Response DfltQ 
Breaking and Entering Admits Post Separ. 
Charges Filed 
the Dwelling Place of 
Another (by breaking 
a window to gain 
access)4 
Unlawful Taking of Admits Post Separ. 
Personal Property^ 
APPEUjANT'g SPQUSAfr AgUgE 
Toward t h e end of t he m a r r i a g e , when Appe l l an t l e a rned of 
R e s p o n d e n t ' s e x t e n s i v e c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y and t h e r e s u l t i n g 
m o n e t a r y damage t o t h e m a r r i a g e , A p p e l l a n t a s s a u l t e d t h e 
Respondent , (Tr . a t 119-122) . 
The R e s p o n d e n t a d m i t t e d on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e 
Appe l l an t had never abused t h e minor c h i l d . ( T r . a t 146 and 
148) . 
The re i s some q u e s t i o n as t o t h e d e g r e e of s e r i o u s n e s s 
and/or s e v e r i t y which Judge Davidson a t t a c h e d t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s 
and t es t imony concern ing a s s a u l t ; t he Respondent p leaded p h y s i c a l 
a b u s e a s he r g r o u n d s f o r t h e d ivo rce (Record) ; however, Judge 
4
 T r . a t 140 and 1 4 1 . 
5
 T r . a t 1 4 1 . 
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Davidson ruled that both parties were entitled to a divorce on 
the grounds of mental cruelty (Tr. at 221). 
HOME STUDY, APPELLANT 
LeAnn Paige, a Human Services worker for the Utah State 
Department of Family Services in Rooseveltf Utah performed the 
home study** evaluation for the Appellant. (Tr. at 166). The 
study, consisting of 13 pages, recommended that Appellant be 
awarded custody of the parties1 minor child. (Record). Ms. 
Paige testified that the emphasis of the home study was on the 
parenting ability of both parents. (Tr. at 166). 
HOME STUDY. RESPONDENT 
Larry Heaton, a social worker for the Utah State Department 
of Social Services in Castle Dale, Utah performed the home study? 
evaluation for the Respondent. The study, consisting of 5 pages, 
recommended that Respondent be awarded custody of the parties1 
minor child. (Record). 
6 Due to the confidential nature of the home study, counsel 
has not included a copy in the Addendum hereto. It is counselfs 
understanding that a copy is contained in the record which has 
been provided to the Supreme Court by the District Court. 
7 Due to the confidential nature of the home study, counsel 
has not included a copy in the Addendum hereto. It is counsel's 
understanding that a copy is contained in the record which has 
been provided to the Supreme Court by the District Court. 
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APPELLANT'S CONCERN FOR MINOR CHILD 
VISITATION: During the pendency of the trial, Appellant 
visited his son on a regular basis. The Respondent admitted that 
during the year preceding the trial, the Appellant had visited 
his son "every Saturday with the exception of seven" and on those 
seven occasions, Respondent had asked Appellant not to visit for 
reasons of the child's sickness or other family illnesses. There 
were "only two or three times" when the Appellant didn't show up 
for visitation. (Tr. at 118: 1-25, 119: 1-2). 
HELP RENDERED: Respondent testified that Appellant "would 
take his turn" in providing "daily care, feeding, clothing, [and] 
things of that nature." Respondent testified that there were 
times when she was working when Appellant would take care of the 
baby. (Tr. at li9) . 
Tom K. Hansen, Appellant's son, testified concerning his 
observations of Appellant and the minor child: 
He plays with him like any normal boy, and when he 
wets—we ask him if he wants to go to the bathroom. He says 
no, because he is having a good time playing or something, 
and he wets his pants and my dad will change him. Nobody 
else does. He kind of clings to him a lot of the time. If 
he gets hurt or something he wants his Dad. When it's time 
to go back [to Respondent] he asks if he can go feed the 
cows and he is—to me when he comes he wants to play with 
his tractors. He is kind of a farm boy to me. I don't 
know. He is just—Dad just acts with him like a normal son 
and father would. (Tr. at 186 and 187). 
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The Appellant testified concerning his son: 
Jim is my only son. He is utmost in my mind at all 
times. It doesn't matter what else is going onf Jim comes 
first.... Jim is very special to me. He and I have a very 
close relationship, and I believe that if he were—should 
the court award me custody I could raise him without the 
violence and the abuse in the home that I believe his Dad 
has. (Tr. at 129) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court committed error in the following 
respects: 
1. CUSTODY: 
A. In the absence of findings of f ac t , the ruling 
a p p e a r s t o be a r b i t r a r y and no t based upon t h e 
evidence. 
B. In the absence of findings of f ac t , the ruling 
appears to not be based upon the "best i n t e r e s t s and 
welfare11 of the minor c h i l d . 
C. The D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i sc re t ion in 
r e fus ing t o admi t i n t o e v i d e n c e t h e A p p e l l a n t ' s 
psychological assessment prepared by Dr. Reed Payne. 
D. Based upon the f a c t t h a t t h e home s t u d y 
evaluat ions were evenly s p l i t on which parent should be 
awarded c u s t o d y , t o g e t h e r w i t h Judge D a v i d s o n ' s 
i n fe rence t h a t the evidence in the case was "equal ," 
11 
and particularly in light of the fact that findings of 
fact are seriously lacking on the issue of custody, it 
appears that the District Court utilized the outdated 
"tender years11 presumption in granting custody of the 
minor child to the Respondent/mother, all in violation 
of constitutional equal protection principles. 
CHILD SUPPORT: 
A. In the absence of findings of fact, and in 
view of the applicable child support schedule and the 
evidence concerning the Appellant's income and other 
child support obligations, the ruling appears to be 
arbitrary and not based upon the evidence. 
DIVISION OF DEBTS: 
A. In the absence of findings of fact, and in 
light of the fact that the District Court ordered 
Respondent to satisfy the debts which arose due to her 
criminal activity, it was error for the Judge to order 
Appellant to pay a debt that was incurred to pay 
Respondent's jail bond. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT WILL NOT OVERTURN A TRIAL COURT'S 
DETERMINATION OF CHILD CUSTODY UNLESS THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY 
SHOWS THAT THE CUSTODY DETERMINATION WAS NOT IN THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD OR THAT THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED 
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF LAW, 
This Court has stated time and again that in a child custody 
case, the evidence must clearly show that the custody 
determination was not in the best interests of the child or that 
the trial court misapplied applicable principles of law. Shioji 
v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985); Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994, 
996 (Utah 1975). 
In the present case, there is no indication from the Courtfs 
Amended Findings of Fact that the Court based its custody ruling 
on the best interests of the child. In fact, the only finding 
pertaining to child custody is set forth in the Findings as 
follows: 
10. Defendant [Respondent] i s a f i t and proper person 
to be awarded the ca r e , custody and c o n t r o l of the minor 
c h i l d of t he p a r t i e s s u b j e c t to the following v i s i t a t i o n 
r i g h t s . . . . (Amended Findings of Fact . See Addendum). 
As w i l l be argued below, the D i s t r i c t Court misappl ied 
p r i n c i p l e s of law in t h i s case t h a t j u s t i f y r e v e r s a l of the 
determination of chi ld custody. 
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A. THE SUPREME COURT IS FREE TO REVIEW QUESTIONS OF 
LAW AND FACT AND TO MAKE FINDINGS OF ITS OWN. 
Notwithstanding the deference which the Supreme Court gives 
to the trial court in custody cases, the Supreme Court is free, 
especially where the findings of fact from the trial court are 
seriously deficient, to review questions of law and fact and to 
make findings of its own. See Pennington v. Pennington. Utah, 
711 P.2d 254, 257 (1985). 
As is argued below, the trial court in this case failed to 
make findings on several crucial issues. 
POINT II 
TO ENSURE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S CUSTODY DETERMINATION 
IS RATIONALLY BASED, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
SET FORTH IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THE BASIC FACTS WHICH SHOW 
WHY THAT ULTIMATE CONCLUSION IS JUSTIFIED. THERE MUST BE A 
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION. A 
CUSTODY DECISION MUST BE SUPPORTED BY WRITTEN FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure state that in an action 
tried without a jury the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon. Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Rule 52 (a). 
This Court has repeatedly stated that the trial court must 
set forth written findings of fact which set forth the basic 
facts which show that its ultimate conclusion is justified. 
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P. 2d 38, 42 (Utah 1982). This 
14 
rationale is more fully developed in the case of Rucker v. 
Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979): 
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent 
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to 
the resolution of dispute under the proper rules of law. To 
that end the findings should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached. 
In a recent ruling by this Court, it was held that the 
findings of fact rendered by the trial court (11 paragraphs, of 
which 7 directly pertained to the issue of child custody) 
[Did] not pass muster since they simply [did] not 
demonstrate a rational factual basis for the ultimate 
decision by reference to pertinent factors that relate to 
the best interests of the child, including specific 
attributes of the parents. Smith v. Smith, 43 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 5 at 5 and 7 (09/30/86). 
In the present case, Judge Davidson's findings of fact 
indicate only the following: 
10. Defendant [Respondent] is a fit and proper person 
to be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor 
child of the parties subject to the following visitation 
rights.... (Amended Findings of Fact. See Addendum). 
Certainly, in comparison to the Smith case, the findings of fact 
in the present case are not even remotely sufficient to "pass 
muster." 
15 
POINT I I I 
THE D I S T R I C T COURTf AS EVIDENCED BY ITS LACK OF 
FINDINGS OF FACT, DID NOT GIVE ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO THE 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PARTIES1 CHARACTER TRAITS OR THE 
TENDENCY THAT THOSE TRAITS MIGHT HAVE TO BE HARMFUL TO THE 
MINOR CHILD; HENCE, THE AWARD OF CUSTODY WAS NOT MADE IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
One p s y c h o l o g i s t has s a i d , 
[ T ] h e c h i l d r e n o f d i v o r c e d p a r e n t s a r e i n s e c u r e ; 
w h a t e v e r t h e i r a p p e a r a n c e , you w i l l f i n d somewhere a p a n i c k y 
l o s s o f m o r a l e , a f i g u r a t i v e h a n g i n g o f t h e h e a d . . . . 
T h e r e f o r e , a l l c u s t o d y d e c i s i o n s s h o u l d be in t e r m s of what 
i s l e a s t ha rmfu l t o t h e c h i l d , o r c o n v e r s e l y , what i s b e s t 
f o r t h e c h i l d u n d e r a d v e r s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " P l a n t , The 
P s y c h i a t r i s t Views C h i l d r e n of P i y p r g g d P g r g n t s , 10 Law & 
C o n t e m p . P r o b . 8 0 7 , 814 ( 1 9 4 4 ) . 
I n Dea rden v . D e a r d e n , U t a h , 15 Utah 2d 1 0 5 , 388 P .2d 231 
( 1 9 6 4 ) , t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e r e l e v a n c e of t h e m o r a l m i s -
c o n d u c t o f a p a r e n t i n a c h i l d c u s t o d y c a s e . T h e C o u r t 
c o n c l u d e d : 
The c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e 
c o n d u c t shown i s of s u c h a n a t u r e a s t o h a z a r d [ t h e c h i l d ' s ] 
w e l f a r e and make i t u n w i s e t h a t s h e be i n h e r m o t h e r ' s 
c u s t o d y . I d . a t 2 3 1 . 
The c a s e of Knapp v . Knapp, U t a h , 273 P . 512 (1929) was a 
c u s t o d y c a s e i n v o l v i n g t h e d i v o r c e d f a t h e r a n d m o t h e r o f 
c h i l d r e n . The f a t h e r / d e f e n d a n t a l l e g e d i n h i s c o u n t e r - p e t i t i o n 
t h a t t h e mother had r e m a r r i e d a man who l i v e s i n p a r t o f f t h e 
e a r n i n g s of women, a s s o c i a t e s w i t h s o - c a l l e d ' p o l i c e c h a r a c t e r s 
and p a n d e r e r s , 1 h a b i t u a l l y c o r r u p t s women, c o m m i t s v a r i o u s 
c r i m i n a l a c t s i n c l u d i n g t h e f t , c h i c a n e r y , d e c e i t , and f r a u d s , and 
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contributes to the delinquency of juveniles. Id. at 513. The 
Supreme Court noted: 
We a r e c l e a r l y of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e moral 
surroundings into which the [mother] placed the chi ld . . . i s 
a proper subject of i n q u i r y . . . . (Citing a l i ne of c a s e s ) . 
I d . 
In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n in Judge 
Davidson's rul ing or in the Amended Findings of Fact t h a t he 
adequa te ly cons idered the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t the p a r e n t s ' p a s t 
behaviors** would c o n t i n u e to occur fo l lowing the d i v o r c e ; 
l ikewise f there i s no indicat ion tha t Judge Davidson weighed the 
impact t h a t such fu tu re behav io r s would tend to have on the 
c h i l d . Of p a r t i c u l a r importance i s the absence from the rul ing 
and the Findings of any indicat ion tha t Judge Davidson had any 
concern a t a l l for Respondent's p a r t i c i p a t i o n in felony crimes, 
involving dishonesty and deception,* and whether the mother would 
be capable to t each the c h i l d , by word and by example, the 
fundamen ta l t r u t h s of hones t b e h a v i o r . In f a c t f the only 
reference the Judge made to the Respondent's fe lonies was t h i s : 
The o n l y t h i n g anybody can r e a l l y say bad about 
[Respondent] i s t h a t she has been in t r o u b l e . " (Tr . a t 
222) . 
8 The mother's h i s to ry of criminal a c t i v i t y and the f a t h e r ' s 
problems with spouse abuse. For a de ta i l ed explanation of the 
evidence t h a t was submit ted a t t r i a l on t h e s e m a t t e r s , see 
"Statement of Facts" here in . 
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Even the most casual observer of the situation would attach 
more significance than Judge Davidson did to the fact that the 
Respondent had pleaded guilty to three felony crimes and admitted 
that she had also committed other acts of breaking and entering 
and theft for which she was not prosecuted^ and to the 
possibility that the minor child of very tender years would be 
raised by a mother having serious anti-social character flaws. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF 
APPELLANT THAT WAS PREPARED BY DR. REED PAYNE. 
On t h e i s s u e of c h i l d c u s t o d y , A p p e l l a n t ' s t r i a l c o u n s e l 
a t tempted t o i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e o f a p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s s e s s m e n t o f 
t h e A p p e l l a n t t h a t had b e e n p e r f o r m e d by D r . Reed Payne o f 
V e r n a l , U t a h . R e s p o n d e n t ' s t r i a l c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d t o t h e 
document for t h e reason t h a t i t was no t "part o f t h e home s tudy" 
o r d e r . (Tr. a t 4 9 ) . T h e r e a f t e r , t h e f o l l o w i n g d i a l o g u e ensued: 
JUDGE: Maybe we need one on [Respondent] a s w e l l . 
RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL: What's good for one s i d e i s good 
for t h e o t h e r . T h a t ' s f i n e w i t h me. 
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: We t o t a l l y a g r e e . I th ink the 
Court might even have some on [ R e s p o n d e n t ] . 
9 T h e s e i n c i d e n t s o f c r i m i n a l b e h a v i o r a r e more f u l l y 
d i s c u s s e d above in the s e c t i o n "Statement of F a c t s . " 
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JUDGE: Not t h a t I 'm aware of . 
RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL: I d o n ' t b e l i e v e i t ' s p a r t of t he 
c r i m i n a l f i l e t h a t counsel i s e lud ing t o , I 'm s u r e , 
JUDGE: At t h i s p o i n t in t ime I ' l l r e s e rve r u l i n g . Do 
you r e s t ? 
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: P l a i n t i f f w i l l r e s t . 
The only o the r r e f e r ence to the p s y c h o l o g i c a l assessment 
d u r i n g t h e t r i a l o c c u r s a t page 168 of t h e T r a n s c r i p t a s 
f o l l o w s : 1 0 
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: Did you have occasion preparing 
your home study to review a psychological assessment of 
[Appellant] prepared by Dr. Payne? 
WITNESS: Yes, I did. 
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: And did you rely upon that 
assessment, in addition to your other contacts you had? 
WITNESS: I think by the time that was completed I had 
already completed my home study. 
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: Was this supportive of your home 
study that you made? 
WITNESS: Yes. 
RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL: I o b j e c t . I t ' s an e f f o r t t o 
admit p o r t i o n s of t h a t s t u d y . 
THE COURT: Sure i s . 
1 0
 C o u n s e l f o r t h e R e s p o n d e n t had c o m p l e t e d d i r e c t 
examinat ion of LeAnn P a i g e , Human Serv ice Worker with t he S t a t e 
Div i s ion of Family Se rv i ces in Rooseve l t , Utah, who had performed 
t h e home s t u d y e v a l u a t i o n of A p p e l l a n t . ( T r . 165 - 1 6 7 ) . 
T h e r e a f t e r , A p p e l l a n t ' s counse l conducted c r o s s examinat ion as i s 
i n d i c a t e d by the d i a logue immediately fol lowing t h i s n o t e . 
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The Cour t ' s comment, "Sure i s , " ind ica tes tha t a t some 
unknown time following page 50 of the Transcript (where the Judge 
ind ica tes he wi l l reserve rul ing on the admissibility of the 
psychological assessment) he made a s i lent rul ing. 
I t would have been most preferable in th i s s i tuat ion if 
Appellant's counsel would have, at some time before the t r i a l ' s 
conclusion, requested that the Court enter a definit ive ruling on 
the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the ev idence ; however, t h e r e i s no 
indication from the Transcript that th is was done. 
Nevertheless, i t was erroneous for the evidence to have been 
excluded from the t r i a l . Respondent's objection was not well 
founded1 1 . The rul ing of the court regarding admiss ib i l i ty 
should have been t h a t the evidence was r e l e v a n t to the 
psychological well-being of the Appellant and his ab i l i ty to 
perform as the custodial parent of the minor child, and that the 
evidence was admissible unless for some other reason i t was 
inadmissible.1 2 indeed, the Utah Rules of Evidence provide: 
1 1
 Respondent ' s counsel objected to the psychological 
assessment on grounds that the document was not part of the court 
order requiring a social worker to perform a home study. 
1 2
 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 401 and 402. 
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If scientific/ technical/ or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledgef skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise.13 
This Court has spoken to the value of psychiatric evidence 
in child custody cases in Mecham v. Mecham, Utah, 544 P.2d 479, 
481 (1975) wherein it said that the "opinions [of psychiatrists] 
are worthy of careful consideration by the [trial] court." 
POINT V 
TO THE EXTENT THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE VIEWED THE CUSTODY 
CASE AS AN "ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL" CASE, AND TO THE EXTENT 
THAT THE JUDGE UTILIZED A CUSTODY PREFERENCE IN FAVOR OF THE 
MOTHER/RESPONDENT, THE RULING GRANTING CUSTODY TO THE MOTHER 
WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND SHOULD BE 
REVERSED. 
Based upon the provisions of article IV, section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the United 
States Constitution, any District Court in the State of Utah 
should be precluded from relying on gender as the preference in a 
child custody case "all other things being equal." Although the 
present case was tried some five months prior to this Court's 
decision in Pusey v. Pusey, Utah, 40 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (08/18/86), 
16
 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702. See also Dixon v. 
gtewafft, 658 P.2d 591 (1982). 
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t h e P u s e y r u l i n g was t h a t t h e Utah and Un i t ed S t a t e s 
Const i tu t ions precluded gender-based preferences and t h a t : 
flWe b e l i e v e the t ime has come to d i s c o n t i n u e our 
s u p p o r t , even in d ic tum, for the no t ion of gender-based 
preferences in chi ld custody ca se s . " Id . a t 4. 
This Court went on to note in Pusey tha t as ea r ly as 1973, cour ts 
had d e c l a r e d t h e m a t e r n a l p r e f e r e n c e , or " t e n d e r y e a r s 
p re sumpt ion , " u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Id . a t 4. The foregoing two 
statements by t h i s Court indica te tha t even pr io r to the August 
18 , 1986 Pusey d e c i s i o n , a gender-based p r e f e r e n c e would be 
inappropr ia te . Accordingly, Appellant respec t fu l ly requests tha t 
in reviewing the May 5, 1986 chi ld custody rul ing in the present 
c a s e , t h a t t h i s Cour t a p p l y t h e p r e - P u s e y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
doctr ines and r a t i o n a l e . 
At t h e t r i a l in t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e Appe l l an t and 
Respondent each presented s ign i f i can t evidence for the purpose of 
showing t h a t the other was not f i t to be awarded custody. In 
summary, the Appel lan t ' s evidence focused on the Responden t ' s 
ch ron ic c r i m i n a l behavior which included evidence of numerous 
criminal convic t ions . The Respondent counte red with evidence 
t h a t t he Appe l l an t had p h y s i c a l l y s t r u c k her dur ing m a r i t a l 
arguments.*4 
1 4
 The evidence which was presented in this regard is more 
fully set forth in the section "Statement of Facts." 
22 
In weighing the evidence presented, Judge Davidson concluded 
in h is rul ing as follows: 
"So i f they a re going to s t a r t p a i n t i n g each other 
black , I think the brush wi l l f i t both. I don ' t find any 
reason to deprive her of custody. I t seems to have worked. 
I don ' t see anything wrong with her as a cus todia l pa ren t . 
From the tes t imony t h a t ' s been given here r pa r t i cu l a ry by 
the preschool lady, she has been working very d i l i g e n t l y in 
taking care of t h i s c h i l d , and the Court finds tha t she i s a 
f i t and proper person and does award cus tody to h e r . " 
(Emphasis added) (Tr. at 222). 
The Judge seemed to indica te tha t before the evidence was 
even presented, he preferred the mother over the father ( i . e . , "I 
don ' t find any reason to deprive her of cus tody) . There appears 
from the Judge's statement an a t t i t u d e s imi lar to t h i s : 
"I think t h a t the mother i s always the pa r en t t h a t 
should be awarded custody. Unless the father can prove to 
me t h a t she shouldn ' t have custody, I don ' t find any reason 
to deprive her of custody." 
Such an a t t i t u d e i s i n c o r r e c t a s i t c l e a r l y v i o l a t e s 
cons t i t u t i ona l equal p ro t ec t i on . The chief c o n s i d e r a t i o n in a 
c h i l d cus tody case has long been "the c h i l d ' s best i n t e r e s t . " 
The t r i a l court must view the evidence presented in terms of the 
c u s t o d y t h a t w i l l be in t h e c h i l d ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t . An 
examinat ion of the t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t and t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
findings of fac ts does not reveal such an a t t i t u d e . 
Fur ther , the t r i a l judge inferred tha t he viewed the case as 
an "a l l things being equal" case ( i . e . , "So i f they are going to 
s t a r t p a i n t i n g each o t h e r b l a c k , I th ink the brush w i l l f i t 
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both"). In other words, the Judge seemed to be saying, "The 
evidence shows that both parties have undesirable 
traits/behaviors ." 
To the extent that Judge Davidson utilized a gender-based 
preference in this case, the custody ruling should be reversed. 
Implicit in this argument is the matter of the Judge having 
erroneously excluded Appellant's evidence in the form of a 
psychological evaluation; admission of such evidence may have 
tilted the scales in the case in favor of the Appellant so that 
the Judge would not have considered it to be an "all things being 
equal" case. This argument is more fully developed below. 
A. PRIOR TO PUSEY V. PUSEY (1986). THE CASE 
LAW OF RECENT YEARS HAS CLEARLY DICTATED THAT 
THE "BEST INTEREST AND WELFARE OF THE MINOR 
CHILD" IS THE PARAMOUNT CONCERN IN A CUSTODY 
CASE OVER AND ABOVE ANY CONSIDERATION OF 
A "TENDER YEARS" PRESUMPTION. 
Utah case law throughout the 1970 era reiterated that any 
"tender years" presumption was subordinate to the consideration 
to be given to the "best interest and welfare" of the minor child 
in a custody case. According to the Court in Bingham v. Bingham. 
Utah, 575 P.2d 703 (1978), this was especially true, 
[U]nder the modern trend of social thinking away from 
former fixed rigidities, toward equality of the sexes and 
greater flexibility in considering the qualifications of the 
parents on an individual basis,.... Id. at 704. 
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In this regard, see also Mecham v. Mecham, Utah, 544 P.2d 479 
(1975) and Arends v. Arends. Utah, 517 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1974). 
POINT VI 
IN VIEW OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTIES AND THE 
APPLICABLE CHILD SUPPORT SCHEDULE UTILIZED IN THE SEVENTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO AWARD CHILD 
SUPPORT OF $140.00 FOR THE MINOR CHILD RATHER THAN $78.00. 
THE FACT THAT NEITHER THE TRANSCRIPT NOR THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT REVEAL ANY UNDERLYING FACTS SHOWING THE REASONS FOR THE 
RULING, THE RULING WAS AN ARBITRARY ONE AND REQUIRES 
REVERSAL. 
At the conclusion of the trial, a dialogue ensued 
between Judge Davidson concerning the amount of child 
support that should be awarded for the support of the 
parties* minor child.15 in substance, the uncontroverted 
1 5
 APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: You've got all the schedules. 
He's got five children and he is making $1,700.00 a 
month. 
THE COURT: One child in this one. 
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: But, your honor, you cannot do 
this to me. You did it last time when we had the four 
children. You made him pay on the basis of four only. 
He has got five children he has got an obligation to 
pay for, and $1,700.00 a month. You have got the proof 
of what his wages are. 
THE COURT: Shall I order him to pay $78.00 a month? 
That's what the schedule says. 
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL: We would appreciate that. 
THE COURT: $140.00. (Tr. at 228 and 229). 
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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of A p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l was t h a t 1) 
Appel lant f s income was $1,700.00 per month, 2) Appellant was 
under an obl iga t ion to support four chi ldren in addi t ion to 
the chi ld involved in the case , 3) Respondent was receiving 
wel fa re from the S t a t e , and 4) the chi ld support schedule 
u t i l i z e d in the Seventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t showed t h a t a 
c h i l d suppor t award of $78.00 for the minor c h i l d was 
ind ica ted . This fact was acknowledged by the Judge y e t , 
without indica t ing his reasons, he ordered chi ld support of 
$140.00. In the absence of f indings of f ac t which would 
j u s t i f y the Judge fs reasons for rul ing as he d id , the rul ing 
can only be character ized as a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s and 
should be reversed. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING APPELLANT TO PAY A 
$3 ,000 DEBT OWED TO HIS FATHER WHICH WAS INCURRED BY 
RESPONDENT THROUGH HER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
The Court ruled at trial that the Respondent pay restitution 
on "any other matters arising from criminal matters, which I 
think I have already ordered in the past." (Tr. at 223). 
However, Judge Davidson also ordered that Appellant should pay 
the n$3,000.00 [debt] to the father." (Tr. at 223). The debt 
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referred to arose when the Respondent needed to borrow money from 
the Appellant's father for bail (Tr. at 40 and 44) in order to be 
released from jail. 
Absent any specific findings in the Transcript or in the 
Findings of Fact, it would appear that the order for Appellant to 
satisfy the $3,000 debt to his father was inconsistent with the 
order that Respondent pay restitution on debts arising from 
criminal matters and is in error. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in several respects in the trial of 
this divorce case. Perhaps central to all of the errors was the 
District Court's failure to set forth any specific findings of 
fact from which reasons for the Court's rulings could be 
concluded. In the absence of specific findings of fact, the 
evidence that was presented at trial tends to show that the 
rulings were arbitrary in nature and not in accordance with the 
evidence. 
Accordingly, the rulings of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court should be reversed. 
27 
DATED this C _ day of October, 1986. 
SHIELDS, SHIELDS & HOLMGREN 
Randall J . H6lntaren 
Attorney forV^ppellant 
ADDBMDON 
Rule 52(a) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
When no exception was taken to a 
charge, it became the law of the case. 
S t raka v. Voyles, GO U. 123, 252 P. 677. 
Unless exception was taken to giving of 
an instruction and complaint concerning 
giving of same made in Supreme Court, 
i t was conclusive upon part ies. Schubach 
v. American Surety Co. of Now York, 73 
U. 332, 273 P . 974. 
Oral instructions. 
While s ta tu te requiring wri t ten instruc-
tions was mandatory, where instructions 
were incorporated into record on appeal, 
and i t appeared therefrom tha t they cor-
rectly s tated law applicable to case, and 
tha t objecting par ty was not prejudiced, 
error in giving oral instructions was not 
fatal to judgment. Van Cott v. Wall, 53 U. 
282, 178 P . 42. 
Since r ight of having jury instructed 
in wri t ing could bo waived, where par ty 
or his a t torney voluntarily and without 
cause absented himself from trial, and 
could not make objection, he could not 
af terwards be heard to complain. Van 
Cott v. Wall, 53 U. 282, 178 P . 42. 
Sta tute requiring wri t ten instructions 
was mandatory and, where there was no 
waiver, failure to reduce all substantial 
instructions to wri t ing for tho use of the 
jury was i r rebut tably presumed to be 
prejudicial. Kunz v. Nelson, 94 U. 185, 70 
P . 2d 577, 115 A. L. B. 1322. 
Request for instruction as precluding 
claim of error in giving it. 
Appellant could not predicate error on 
the giving of an instruction containing 
identical language embodied in his re-
quest. S t raka v. Voyles, 69 U. 123, 252 P . 
677. 
Request for instructions. 
Error could not bo based on failure to 
give a part icular instruction when no 
request thorefor was made as provided 
by s ta tute . State v. Yee Poo Lun, 45 U. 
531, 147 P . 488; In re Hansen's Will, 
50 U. 207, 167 P . 256; Salt Lake & U. 
R. Co. v. Schramm, 56 U. 53, 189 P . 90; 
Taylor v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 61 
U. 524, 216 P . 239. 
Where request for special instruction 
was oral, Supreme Court could not con-
sider assignment of error based upon 
court 's refusal to give instruction. Kout-
Kis v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 63 
U. 251, 225 P . 339. 
Sufficiency of instructions as to law. 
The court does not discharge i ts duty 
by giving the jury mere lexical and cyclo-
pedic definitions, and mere abstract propo-
sitions of law. The court itself should ap-
ply the law to the part icular facts and 
should direct the jury as to the legal 
effect of part icular facts found. Smith v. 
Cannady, 45 U. 521, 147 P . 210. 
Tn a will contest, it was error to fail 
to charge upon a question of law "applica-
ble to the case," as upon undue influence, 
as tha t was not a mat ter upon which 
"special instruction!7 had to be requested. 
Tn re Hansen's Will, 50 U. 207, 167 P . 256. 
While it was not necessary tha t court 
instruct upon every point tha t was raised 
in case, unless requested by counsel a t 
proper timo, yet court could not merely 
give jury abst ract propositions of law; 
the instructions had to bo applicable to 
issues, facts, and circumstances of par-
ticular case "on trial. Ever t s v. Worrell, 58 
U. 238, 197 P. 1043, 20 N. C. C. A. 849. 
Theories of parties. 
Theories presented by pleadings or 
otherwise had to be supported by some 
evidence in order to be submitted to jury 
by way of instructions. State Bank of 
Beaver County v. Tlollingshead, 82 U. 416, 
25 P. 2d 612. 
Time to make requests. 
Koquost for instructions should be pre-
sented to the court before the charge to 
the jury was given; if not handed to 
court until after jury had been instructed, 
the court could refuse i t for tha t reason. 
Fl int v. Nelson, 10 U. 261, 37 P . 479, affd. 
166 U. S. 276, 41 L. Ed. 1002, 17 S. Ct. 
570, applying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §3362. 
A district court rule requiring plaintiff 
to ask special instruction before evidence 
of defendant was in was unfair and un-
reasonable, and in conflict with s ta tu te ; 
accordingly, it was invalid. Mulford v. 
Bamberger Elec. K. Co., 76 U. 136, 287 P. 
929. 
RULE 52 
FINDINGS BY THE COURT 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with 
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to 
218 
TRIALS Rule 52(a) 
u 
t-
63 
tv 
lo-
nd 
m\ 
v. 
ail 
c, 
ick 
cd. 
'36. 
u rt 
d 
a t 
cly 
»w; 
lo 
• •ir-
. 58 
or 
mie 
oV 
16, 
p re-
in 
ed. 
' O i l . 
11.1. 
< ' » . 
'> )2. 
.tiff 
i r e 
mi-
ni c ; 
i v . 
7 P. 
Rule 58A; and hi granting or refusing iulerloeulory injunctions Hie <*ourl 
shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not neces-
sary for purposes of review. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the cpurt. Findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under 
Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
Compiler's Notes. 
with 
tely 
to 
Rule 52(a) was amended ]>v Hie Su-
preme Court on June .'{0, 1965, effective 
October 1, 1965. The amendment, in the 
first sentence, deleted "unless the same 
are waived" after " the court shall"; and 
subst i tuted "and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A" for "and direct the 
entry of the appropriate judgment ." 
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 52(a) , 
but subst i tutes "Rule 58A" for "Rule 58" 
in the first sentence; deletes a sentence 
appearing in the Fed. Rule between the 
second and third sentences of the Utah 
Rule which reads, "Findings of fact shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the tr ial court to judge the 
credibility of witnesses,"; and deletes an-
other sentence appearing in the Fed. Rule 
between the third and fourth sentences of 
the Utah Rule which reads, "If an opinion 
or memorandum of decision is filed, it will 
be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law appear therein." 
Cross-References. 
Masters, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
53. 
Scope of review on appeal, Const. Art . 
VII I , § 9. 
Adoption of findings in determination of 
water rights. 
Where a tr ial court entered an inter-
locutory decree in a s ta tu tory suit for 
the general determination of water r ights 
and adopted the findings contained in 
the proposed determination of the s ta te 
engineer which contained all i tems re-
quired by chapter 4, Title 73, such pro-
cedure was sufficient to comply with the 
rule that , in all actions tried upon facts 
without a jury, the court shall, in the 
absence of waiver, find facts specially and 
state separately i ts conclusions of law 
thereon. In re Use of Water within 
Drainage Area of Green River, 12 U. (2d) 
102, 363 P . 2d 199. 
Contempt in presence of court. 
This Rule and section 78-32-3 indicate 
that where the contempt is committed in 
the presence of the court tha t wr i t ten 
findings of facts, conclusions of law and 
judgment are contemplated, that the facts 
must be recited as occurring in the imme-
diate view and presence of the court, ad-
judging tha i a contempt has been commit-
ted and the punishment. I t is not enough 
tha t the court in open court announced 
in detail i ts findings, conclusions and de-
cree as tha t does not meet the require-
ments of these provisions. Brown v. Cook, 
123 U. 505, 260 P . 2d 544. 
Duty of trial court. 
In a contract action by a real estate 
broker for his commission, where the de-
fendant raises the issue of abandonment 
of the contract by his answer, the court 
should make findings on the issue of 
abandonment. Failure of the tr ial court 
to make findings of fact on all material 
issues is reversible error where it is prej-
udicial. Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 U. 
(2d) 43, 278 P. 2d 284. 
In a suit to establish r ight of way for 
an ir i igat ion ditch by prescriptive ease-
ment, wheie the pleadings made an issue 
of whether easement had been acquired 
and it was clear that the ditch had been 
used for more than twenty years to irri-
gate lands of plaintiffs, t r ial court was re-
quired to make a direct finding on tha t 
issue. Harmon v. Rasmussen, 13 IT. (2d) 
422, 375 P. 2d 762. 
The trial court has the rosponsibiiiiy of 
determining questions of fact upon which 
there is disagreement. LeGrand Johnson 
Corp. v. Peterson, 18 U. (2d) 260, 120 P. 
2d 615. 
In juvenile action, court must not only 
make findings to support the proof of 
every fact necessary to consti tute the of-
fense charged, but also make findings to 
support the preliminary adjudication tha t 
the child is within the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court. S ta te in In teres t of R. N., 
527 P . 2d 1356. 
Where plaintiffs, in action for breach of 
contract, requested finding by court on 
material issue as to whether the founda-
tion of their house had been located in 
accordance with zoning ordinances and 
restr ict ive covenants, i t was the duty of 
the court to make such a finding. Quagli-
ana v. Exquisi te Home Builders, Inc. , 538 
P . 2d 301. 
Memorandum decision. 
Where a memorandum of decision is 
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Rule 401 RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE IV 
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS 
RELEVANT EV1D. 
Rule 
401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence." 
402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible. 
403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of 
Time. 
404. Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other 
Crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. 
(1) Character of accused. 
(2) Character of victim. 
(3) Character of witness. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
405. Methods of Proving Character. 
(a) Reputation or opinion. 
(b) -Specific instances of conduct. 
406. Habit; Routine Practice. 
407. Subsequent Remedial Measures. 
408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise. 
409. Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses. 
410. Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements. 
411. Liability Insurance. 
412. [Not Adopted] 
RULE 401 
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence. 
Committee Note to Rule 401. 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and 
is comparable in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rule 
defined relevant evidence as that having a 
tendency to prove or disprove the existence of 
any "material fact." Avoiding the use of the 
term "material fact" accords with the applica-
tion given to former Rule 1(2) by the Utah 
Supreme Court. State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 
1387 (Utah 1977). 
Law Reviews. — Utah Rules of Evidence 
1983,1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78. 
All relevant evidus 
Constitution of the 1 
statute, or by these 
State. Evidence wliic1 
Committee Note to Rnli-
The text of this rule I* 
Rules of Evidence (197 l> -
the word "statute" the \\"i 
the United States"* h a v 
EXCLUSION -
PREJL-j-
Although releva 
substantially out\ 
issues, or mislead! 
time, or needle1 - . 
Committee Note (>> 
This rule is the (• . 
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Rules of Evi<Wn-f ' ' 
prise" is not .ucUui ' 
of relevant o\ i.i >rr * • 
is not one of MII 
would be within the 
dice" as contained in K1 
sory Committee Note-
indicating that a cfp 
stances would be a in. 
of dealing with "sur;n 
Estelle, 445 F. Supp 
ANAL 
Discretion of court. 
Evidence of other often 
Failure to make find in; 
Film of murder scene. 
Guilty plea. 
Impeachment of credibilit 
Photographs of victim. 
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RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS Rule 403 
RULE 402 
=TS 
inadmissible, 
fusion, or Waste of 
Exceptions; Other 
RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; IRRELEVANT 
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this 
State. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Committee Note to Rule 402. 
The text of this rule is Rule 402, Uniform 
Rules of Evidence (1974) except (hat prior to 
the word "statute" the words "Constitution of 
the United States"* have been added. 
*The Utah rule also adds the words: "or the 
Constitution of the State of Utah." 
RULE 403 
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
v v to maks the 
.aination of the 
/ithout the evi-
Committee Note to Rule 403. 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and 
is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah 
Rules of Evidence 11971) except that "sur-
prise" is not included as a basis for exclusion 
of relevant evidence. The change in language 
is not one of substance, since "surprise" 
would be within the concept oi "unfair preju-
dice" as contained in Rule 402. See also Advi-
sory Committee Notes to Federal Rule 403 
indicating that a continuance m most in-
stances would be a more appropriate method 
of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. 
Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977) 
l&urpi use use of psychiatric testimony in capi-
tal case1 ruled prejudicial and violation of due 
process). See the following Utah cases to the 
same effect. Terry v. Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 
(Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 
(Utah 1982). 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evi-
dence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a). 
Law Reviews. — Chapman v. State: 
Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony — An Is-
sue of Admissibility or Credibility, 1983 
Utah L. Rev. 381. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER RULES 
ords with the applica-
nt* H2> by the Utah 
Peterson, 56Q P.2d 
h Rules of Evidence 
63, 78. 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of court. 
Evidence of other offenses. 
Failure to make findings. 
Film of murder scene. 
Guilty plea. 
Impeachment of credibility. 
Photographs of victim. 
Prejudice. 
Prior shoplifting conviction. 
Risk at time of attack. 
Traits of typical child abuser. 
Transcripts of defendant's conversations. 
Discretion of court. 
Supreme Court would not interfere with a 
trial court's ruling under former rule unless 
it clearly appeared that the trial court so 
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Rule 701 RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 701 
OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are 
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a 
clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
Committee Note to Rule 701. 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and 
is substantially the same as Rule 19, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971). Rule 56(1), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) contained similar 
language. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER RULES 
Gestation period for humans. 
In paternity action, admission of mother's 
testimony concerning gestation i was not 
error. Roods v. Roods (1982) 645 P.2d 640. 
RULE 702 
TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
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Committee Note to Rule 702. 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
was substantially the same. 
Cross-References. — Discovery of ex-
pert's opinion, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
26(b)(4). 
Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in de-
termining nature of object as, 58-37a-4. 
Pretrial conference, consideration of limit-
ing number of expert witnesses, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 16. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER RULES 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of court. 
Heroin use. 
Reliability of eyewitness testimony. 
Standard of care. 
— Trade or profession. 
Discret ion^ court. 
It is within the discretion of the trial court 
to determine the suitability of expert testi-
mony in a case and the qualifications of the 
proposed expert witness. State v. Clayton 
(1982) 646 P.2d 723. 
Heroin use. 
Opinion testimony on the subject of heroin 
use is admissible. State v. Fort (1977) 572 
P.2d 1387. 
Reliability of eyewitness testimony. 
Whether expert testimony should be al-
lowed as to the merits of eyewitness identifi-
cation in a criminal case is within the discre-
tion of the trial court. State v. Malmrose 
(1982) 649 P.2d 56. 
Standard of care. 
— Trade or profession. 
Although ordinarily the standard of care in 
a trade or profession must be determined by 
testimony of witnesses in the same trade or 
profession, nothing precludes the court's con-
ANALYSI 
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JOHN E. SCHINDLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
First Interstate Bank Bldg, 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: 637-1783 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
********************* 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No, 85-CV-42-D 
A; LAMAR HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v s • 
CYNTHIA ANN HANSEN, 
Defendant, 
********************* 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on the 5th day of March, 1986, the 
Honorable Richard C. Davidson, District Judge, presiding; 
and, the plaintiff having been personally present and 
represented by counsel, George E* Mangan and the defendant 
having been personally present and represented by counsel, 
John E. Schindler and the Court having heard the testimony 
presented and having considered same together with all 
exhibits of record and further, having reviewed the file in 
this matter and being otherwise fully informed, now finds 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction over the f-iteo 
7th DISTRICT COURT DUCHESNE 
STATF OP •ITAH 
APR 9 1 1385 
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h e r e t o and the s u b j e c t ma t t e r hereof . 
2. That t h e p a r t i e s h a v e been a c t u a l and bona f i d e 
r e s i d e n t s of Duchesne County, S t a t e of Utah, for more than 
t h r e e (3) months i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r to t h e commencement of 
t h i s a c t i o n , 
3. That t h e p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t were m a r r i e d on 
December 1 1 , 1 9 8 1 , a t E l k o , Nevada , and h a v e been husband 
and wife s i n c e t h a t t ime, 
4. That one (1) c h i l d has been born to the p a r t i e s of 
t h i s c a u s e , t o - w i t : ARON JIM HANSEN, born O c t o b e r 14 , 
1983. That no o the r c h i l d r e n a r e expec ted . 
5. Tha t t h e d e f e n d a n t has t r e a t e d t h e p l a i n t i f f 
c r u e l l y caus ing him g r e a t menta l d i s t r e s s and s u f f e r i n g . 
6. Tha t t h e p l a i n t i f f has t r e a t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t 
c r u e l l y caus ing her g r e a t menta l d i s t r e s s and s u f f e r i n g . 
7. That the p a r t i e s have accumula ted c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y 
and h a v e d i v i d e d same and t h a t each s h o u l d be awarded t h e 
p r o p e r t y c u r r e n t l y in t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n wi th the f o l l o w i n g 
e x c e p t i o n s : 
a . One (1) 1974 C a d i l l a c a u t o m o b i l e t o t h e 
p l a i n t i f f . 
b. A sewing t a b l e to the defendant* 
8. The p l a i n t i f f i s awarded whatever i n t e r e s t t h a t he 
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shall have visitation from 10:00 a.m. December 23 to 6:00 
p.m. December 24 during the year of 1986; during the year 
of 1987 plaintiff shall have visitation from 10:00 a.m. 
December 25 to 6:00 p.m. December 26. Thereafter said 
visitation will alternate yearly. 
e. Beginning in the year 1987 the weekend 
visitation will extend to 7:00 p.m. Friday night to 6:00 
p.m. Sunday. 
f. Plaintiff shall have two (2) weeks visitation 
during the summer of 1986 beginning at 6:00 p.m. Friday of 
the second weekend in June and concluding the 4th weekend 
in June at 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The plaintiff shall give 
defendant ten (10) days written notice of the date which 
will be the first day of his two (2) week visitation. 
g. In 1987 plaintiff shall have three (3) weeks 
summer visitation beginning the second weekend in June and 
concluding on the second weekend thereafter. 
4. That each party be and is hereby awarded the 
personal property currently in their possession with the 
following exceptions: 
a. One (1) 1974 Cadillac automobile shall be and 
is hereby awarded to the plaintiff. 
b. One (1) sewing table shall be and is hereby 
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may have in t h i r t y - f i v e (35) a c r e s l o c a t e d near C l e v e l a n d , 
Emery County, S t a t e of Utah. 
9. Tha t t h e p a r t i e s h a v e a c q u i r e d c e r t a i n d e b t s 
du r ing the cour se of t h e i r mar r i age which s h a l l be d isposed 
of as f o l l o w s : 
A. P l a i n t i f f s h a l l assume and pay the f o l l o w i n g 
o b l i g a t i o n s and hold the defendant ha rmless t h e r e o n : 
1. C a b l e T.V. in t h e amount of $55 .74 . 
2. I n d e b t e d n e s s to p l a i n t i f f ' s f a t h e r in 
the amount of $29,437.18. 
3 . T e l e p h o n e company i n t h e a m o u n t of 
$130.00 . 
4. I ndeb tedness to an a t t o r n e y in Colorado 
for the r e c o v e r y of sheep in the amount of $4,000.00. 
5. I ndeb tedness to Tom Davis in the amount 
of $ 7 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
6. F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e Bank in t h e amount of 
$183 ,000 .00 . 
7. Acorn C r e d i t Union in t h e amount of 
$ 6 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . 
8. F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank in t h e amount of 
$11 ,000 .00 . 
9. C a s t l e v i e w H o s p i t a l in t h e amount of 
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$59 .07 . 
B. Defendant s h a l l assume and pay the f o l l o w i n g 
o b l i g a t i o n s and ho ld p l a i n t i f f h a r m l e s s t h e r e o n : 
1. A l l amounts due and owing c o n c e r n i n g 
f i n e s in any c r i m i n a l case in which de fendan t was i n v o l v e d . 
2. Pa t sy Grange in the amount of $3,000.00. 
3 . Aron G a l e H a n s e n i n t h e a m o u n t of 
$ 3 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . 
4. C a s t l e v i e w H o s p i t a l in t h e amount of 
$59 .07 . 
5. Brad Holm in the amount $135.00. 
6. Ken Anderton in the amount of $400.00. 
7. Ray Mar t ineau in the amount of $650.00. 
10. Defendant i s a f i t and p rope r pe rson to be awarded 
t h e c a r e , c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l of t h e minor c h i l d of t h e 
p a r t i e s s u b j e c t to t he f o l l o w i n g v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s p rov ided 
the p l a i n t i f f p r o p e r l y demean h i m s e l f : 
a. Second and f o u r t h weekend of each month 
b e g i n n i n g 10:00 a.m. S a t u r d a y and c o n c l u d i n g 6:00 p.m. 
Sunday. 
b . T.he p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n from 
10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on t h e i o l l o w i n g h o l i d a y s in t h e 
year 1986: E a s t e r , J u l y 4 t h , and Labor Day. The de fendan t 
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s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n on t h e f o l l o w i n g h o l i d a y s in 1986: 
Memor ia l Day, J u l y 24 th and T h a n k s g i v i n g . The d e f e n d a n t 
w i l l have the c h i l d for New Year 's Day in 1987. T h e r e a f t e r 
the p a r t i e s w i l l e x e r c i s e v i s i t a t i o n on a l t e r n a t i n g y e a r s , 
c . The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n on 
F a t h e r ' s Day each y e a r from 10:00 a.m. t o 6:00 p.m. The 
defendant s h a l l have the minor c h i l d on Mother ' s Day each 
year . 
d. Regarding the Chr i s tmas h o l i d a y : p l a i n t i f f 
s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n from 10:00 a.m. December 23 t o 6:00 
p.m. December 24 d u r i n g t h e y e a r of 1986; d u r i n g t h e y e a r 
of 1987 p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n from 10:00 a.m. 
December 25 t o 6:00 p.m. December 26. T h e r e a f t e r s a i d 
v i s i t a t i o n w i l l a l t e r n a t e y e a r l y . 
e . B e g i n n i n g in t h e y e a r 1987 t h e weekend 
v i s i t a t i o n w i l l e x t e n d to 7:00 p.m. F r i d a y n i g h t to 6:00 
p.m. Sunday. 
f. P l a i n t i f f s h a l l have two (2) weeks v i s i t a t i o n 
dur ing the summer of 1986 beg inn ing a t 6:08 .p.m. F r iday of 
t h e second weekend in June and c o n c l u d i n g t h e 4 t h weekend 
in June a t 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l g i v e 
d e f e n d a n t t e n (10) d a y s w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e d a t e which 
w i l l be the f i r s t day of h i s two (2) week v i s i t a t i o n . 
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g. In 1987 p l a i n t i f f s h a l l have t h r e e (3) weeks 
summer v i s i t a t i o n beg inn ing the second weekend in June and 
c o n c l u d i n g on the second weekend t h e r e a f t e r . 
1 1 . The d e f e n d a n t may c l a i m t h e minor c h i l d of t h e 
p a r t i e s as a d e d u c t i o n in t h e y e a r 1985 . T h e r e a f t e r t h e 
p l a i n t i f f may c l a i m the minor c h i l d as a deduc t ion for tax 
p u r p o s e s so l o n g a s he r e m a i n s c u r r e n t in payment of h i s 
c h i l d suppor t o b l i g a t i o n . 
12. The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l pay t h e sum of $140.00 p e r 
month as and for c h i l d s u p p o r t . 
13. That i f c o u r t o rdered c h i l d suppor t becomes d e l i n -
q u e n t a s d e f i n e d by S e c t i o n 7 8 - 4 5 d - l ' , U.C.A.f 1953 , a s 
amended, a l l c u r r e n t and p a s t due c h i l d s u p p o r t s h a l l 
t h e r e a f t e r be w i t h h e l d from t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s income in 
accordance wi th the r u l e s of p r a c t i c e of t h i s c o u r t . 
Tha t t h i s o r d e r s h a l l r e m a i n . i n e f f e c t u n t i l t h e 
de fendan t no longe r owes c h i l d s u p p o r t , and should a p p l y 
to a l l e x i s t i n g and f u t u r e payor s . 
14. That p l a i n t i f f m a i n t a i n m e d i c a l , o p t i c a l and den-
t a l i n s u r a n c e on t h e minor c h i l d , so l o n g as t h e same i s 
a v a i l a b l e to him through h i s employment. Any amounts not 
p a i d by i n s u r a n c e w i l l be p a i d o n e - h a l f (1 /2) by e a c h of 
the p a r t i e s . 
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15. Each pay s h a l l b e a r t h e i r own r e s p e c t i v e c o s t s and 
a t t o r n e y s 1 f e e s i n c u r r e d in t h i s m a t t e r . 
The C o u r t h a v i n g e n t e r e d t h e f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s of 
F a c t , now makes t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. T h a t t h e C o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p a r t i e s 
h e r e t o and t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r h e r e o f . 
2 . T h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s h a l l b e g r a n t e d a d i v o r c e 
from d e f e n d a n t . 
3 . T h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s h a l l be g r a n t e d a d i v o r c e 
from p l a i n t i f f . 
4 . D e f e n d a n t s h a l l b e a w a r d e d t h e c a r e , c u s t o d y and 
c o n t r o l of t h e m i n o r c h i l d of t h e p a r t i e s , t o - w i t : ARON 
JIM HANSEN, b o r n O c t o b e r 14 , 1 9 8 3 , s u b j e c t t o t h e f o l l o w i n g 
v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s p r o v i d e d t h e p l a i n t i f f p r o p e r l y demean 
h i m s e l f : 
a . S e c o n d and f o u r t h w e e k e n d of e a c h m o n t h 
b e g i n n i n g 1 0 : 0 0 a.m. S a t u r d a y and c o n c l u d i n g 6 :00 p.m. 
Sunday . 
b . The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n f rom 
1 0 : 0 0 a.m. t o 6 : 0 0 p.m. on t h e f o l l o w i n g h o l i d a y s i n t h e 
y e a r 1986 : E a s t e r , J u l y 4 t h , and Labor Day. The d e f e n d a n t 
s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n on t h e f o l l o w i n g h o l i d a y s i n 1 9 8 6 : 
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Memor ia l Dayf J u l y 2 4 t h and T h a n k s g i v i n g . The d e f e n d a n t 
w i l l have t h e c h i l d for New Year f s Day in 1987. T h e r e a f t e r 
t he p a r t i e s w i l l e x e r c i s e v i s i t a t i o n on a l t e r n a t i n g y e a r s . 
c . The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n on 
F a t h e r ' s Day e a c h y e a r from 10:00 a.m. t o 6:00 p.m.. The 
de fendan t s h a l l have the minor c h i l d on Mother ' s Day each 
y e a r . 
d. Regarding the Chr i s tmas h o l i d a y : p l a i n t i f f 
s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n from 10:00 a.m. December 23 t o 6:00 
p.m. December 24 d u r i n g t h e y e a r of 1986; d u r i n g t h e y e a r 
of 1987 p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n from 10:00 a.m. 
December 25 t o 6:00 p.m. December 26. T h e r e a f t e r s a i d 
v i s i t a t i o n w i l l a l t e r n a t e y e a r l y . 
e . B e g i n n i n g i n t h e y e a r 1987 t h e w e e k e n d 
v i s i t a t i o n w i l l e x t e n d t o 7:00 p.m. F r i d a y n i g h t t o 6:00 
p.m. Sunday* 
f. P l a i n t i f f s h a l l have two (2) weeks v i s i t a t i o n 
d u r i n g t h e summer of 1986 b e g i n n i n g a t 6:00 p.m. F r i d a y of 
t h e s econd weekend i n June and c o n c l u d i n g t h e 4 th weekend 
in June a t 6:00 p.iru on Sunday . The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l g i v e 
d e f e n d a n t t e n (10) d a y s w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e d a t e which 
w i l l be the f i r s t day of h i s two (2) week v i s i t a t i o n . 
g* In 1987 p l a i n t i f f s h a l l have t h r e e (3) weeks 
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summer visitation beginning the second weekend in June and 
concluding on the second weekend thereafter. 
5, The property accumulated by the parties during 
their marriage is to be awarded as per paragraph 7 a and b 
of the Findings of Fact. 
6. The plaintiff is awarded whatever interest that he 
may have in thirty-five (35) acres located near Cleveland, 
Emery County, State of Utah. 
7. The debts and obligations of the shall shall be 
disposed of pursuant to paragraph 9 A and B of the Findings 
of Fact. 
8. The defendant may claim the minor child of the 
parties as a deduction in the year 1985. Thereafter the 
plaintiff may claim the minor child as a deduction for tax 
purposes so long as he remains current in his child sup-
port. 
9. The plaintiff shall pay the sum of $140.00 per 
month as and for child support. 
10. That if court ordered child support becomes delin-
quent as defined by Section 78-45d-l, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended, all current and past due child support shall 
thereafter be withheld from the defendant's income in 
accordance with the rules of practice of this court. 
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T h a t t h i s o r d e r s h a l l r e m a i n i n e f f e c t u n t i l t h e 
d e f e n d a n t no l o n g e r owes c h i l d s u p p o r t , and s h o u l d a p p l y 
t o a l l e x i s t i n g and f u t u r e p a y o r s , 
1 1 . T h a t p l a i n t i f f m a i n t a i n m e d i c a l , o p t i c a l and d e n -
t a l i n s u r a n c e on t h e m i n o r c h i l d , so l o n g a s t h e same i s 
a v a i l a b l e t o him t h r o u g h h i s emp loymen t . Any amounts n o t 
p a i d by i n s u r a n c e w i l l be p a i d o n e - h a l f ( 1 / 2 ) by e a c h of 
t h e p a r t i e s . 
12. Each pay s h a l l b e a r t h e i r own r e s p e c t i v e c o s t s and 
a t t o r n e y s 1 f e e s i n c u r r e d in t h i s m a t t e r . 
1 3 . The D e c r e e of D i v o r c e i s s u e d h e r e i n s h a l l b e c o m e 
a b s o l u t e and f i n a l upon i t s e n t r y by t h e C l e r k of t h e C o u r t 
i n t h e R e g i s t e r of A c t i o n . 
DATED t h i s / ^T day of / f / V / / , 1986. 
RICHARD C. DAVIDSON 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On t h e 8 t h d a y of A p r i l , 1 9 8 6 , I h e r e b y m a i l e d a t r u e 
and c o r r e c t c o p y of t h e a b o v e and f o r e g o i n g FINDINGS OF 
Page Twelve 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
George E, Mangan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
47 North Second East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
A. Lamar Hansen 
Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 257 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
~^S ^ o V v'^P v; x \f*-c^  
Secretary 
JOHN E* SCHINDLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
First Interstate Bank Bldg. 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: 63 7-178 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
a******************** 
A. LAMAR HANSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CYNTHIA ANN HANSEN, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 85-CV-42-D 
********************* 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on the 5th day of March, 1986, and the 
Honorable Richard C. Davidson, District Judge, presiding; 
and, the plaintiff having been personally present and 
represented by counsel, George E. Mangan and the defendant 
having been personally present and represented by counsel, 
John E. Schindler and the Court having heard the testimony 
presented and having considered same together with all 
exhibits of record and further having reviewed the file in 
this matter and being otherwise fully informed, and the 
Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law now, therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DEC FFLED; 
7th DISTRICT COURT DUCHESNE 
GTATC n r i i T A i ^ 
APR 2 1 1985 
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1. Tha t t h e p l a i n t i f f be and i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d a 
d i v o r c e from the d e f e n d a n t . 
2. Tha t t h e d e f e n d a n t be and i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d a 
d i v o r c e from the p l a i n t i f f . 
3. That t h e d e f e n d a n t i s h e r e b y awarded t h e c a r e , 
cus tody and c o n t r o l of t h e minor c h i l d of the p a r t i e s , t o -
w i t : ARON JIM HANSEN, b o r n O c t o b e r 14 , L983 s u b j e c t to 
p l a i n t i f f ' s v i s i t a t i o n prov ided he p r o p e r l y demean h imse l f : 
a. Second and f o u r t h weekend of each month 
b e g i n n i n g 10:00 a.iru S a t u r d a y and c o n c l u d i n g 6:00 p.m. 
Sunday. 
b . The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n from 
10:00 a.m. t o 6:00 p.m. on t h e f o l l o w i n g h o l i d a y s in t h e 
year 1986: E a s t e r , J u l y 4 th , and Labor Day. The defendant 
s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n on t h e f o l l o w i n g h o l i d a y s in 1986: 
Memor ia l Day, J u l y 24 th and T h a n k s g i v i n g . The d e f e n d a n t 
w i l l have the c h i l d for New Year 's Day in 1987. T h e r e a f t e r 
the p a r t i e s w i l l e x e r c i s e v i s i t a t i o n on a l t e r n a t i n g y e a r s . 
c . The p l a i n t i f f s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n on 
F a t h e r ' s Day each y e a r from 10:00 a.m. t o 6:00 p.m. The 
defendant s h a l l have the minor c h i l d on Mother ' s Day each 
year . 
d. Regarding t h e Chr is tmas h o l i d a y : p l a i n t i f f 
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shall have visitation from 10:00 a.m. December 23 to 6:00 
p.m. December 24 during the year of 1986; during the year 
of 1987 plaintiff shall have visitation from 10:00 a.m. 
December 25 to 6:00 p.m. December 26. Thereafter said 
visitation will alternate yearly. 
e. Beginning in the year 1987 the weekend 
visitation will extend to 7:00 p.m. Friday night to 6:00 
p.m. Sunday. 
f. Plaintiff shall have two (2) weeks visitation 
during the summer of 1986 beginning at 6:00 p.m. Friday of 
the second weekend in June and concluding the 4th weekend 
in June at 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The plaintiff shall give 
defendant ten (10) days written notice of the date which 
will be the first day of his two (2) week visitation. 
g. In 1987 plaintiff shall have three (3) weeks 
summer visitation beginning the second weekend in June and 
concluding on the second weekend thereafter. 
4. That each party be and is hereby awarded the 
personal property currently in their possession with the 
following exceptions: 
a. One (1) 1974 Cadillac automobile shall be and 
is hereby awarded to the plaintiff. 
b. One (1) sewing table shall be and is hereby 
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awarded to the defendan t , 
5. The p l a i n t i f f be and i s h e r e b y awarded w h a t e v e r 
i n t e r e s t t h a t he may have in t h i r t y - f i v e (35) a c r e s l o c a t e d 
near C l e v e l a n d , Emery County, S t a t e of Utah* 
6. Tha t t h e p l a i n t i f f s h a l l assume and pay t h e 
f o l l o w i n g o b l i g a t i o n s and h o l d t h e d e f e n d a n t h a r m l e s s 
t h e r e o n : 
a. C a b l e T.V. in t h e amount of $55*74. 
b . I n d e b t e d n e s s t o p l a i n t i f f ' s f a t h e r in t h e 
amount of $29,437.18. 
c. Telephone company in the amount of $130.00. 
d. I n d e b t e d n e s s t o an a t t o r n e y in C o l o r a d o f o r 
the r e c o v e r y of sheep in the amount of $4,000.00. 
e . I n d e b t e d n e s s to Tom D a v i s in t h e amount of 
$70 ,000 .00 . 
f. F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e Bank i n t h e amoun t of 
$183 ,000 .00 . 
g. Acorn C r e d i t Union in the amount of $6,500.00. 
h. F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bank i n t h e amount of 
$11 ,000 .00 . 
i. Castleview Hospital in the amount of 
$59.07. 
7. That the defendant shall assume and pay the 
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following obligations and hold plaintiff harmless thereon: 
a. All amounts due and owing concerning fines in 
any criminal case in which defendant was involved. 
b. Patsy Grange in the amount of $3,000.00. 
c. Aron Gale Hansen in the amount of $3,500.00. 
d. Castleview Hospital in the amount of $59.07. 
e. Brad Holm in the amount $135.00. 
f. Ken Anderton in the amount of $400.00. 
g. Ray Martineau in the amount of $650.00. 
8. That plaintiff is hereby ordered to maintain 
medical, optical and dental insurance on the minor child, 
so long as the same is available to him through his employ-
ment. Any amounts not paid by insurance will be paid one-
half (1/2) by each of the parties. 
9. The defendant shall claim the minor child of the 
parties as a deduction in the year 1985. Thereafter the 
plaintiff shall claim the minor child as a deduction for 
tax purposes so long as he remains current in payment of 
his child support obligation. 
10. The plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the sum of 
$140.00 per month as and for child support. 
11. That if court ordered child support becomes delin-
quent as defined by Section 78-45d-l, U.C.A., 1953, as 
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a m e n d e d , a l l c u r r e n t and p a s t due c h i l d s u p p o r t s h a l l 
t h e r e a f t e r be w i t h h e l d f rom t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n c o m e i n 
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e r u l e s of p r a c t i c e of t h i s c o u r t . 
T h a t t h i s o r d e r s h a l l r e m a i n i n e f f e c t u n t i l t h e 
d e f e n d a n t no l o n g e r owes c h i l d s u p p o r t , and s h a l l a p p l y t o 
a l l e x i s t i n g and f u t u r e p a y o r s . 
1 2 . E a c h p a y i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d t o p a y t h e i r own 
r e s p e c t i v e c o s t s and a t t o r n e y s 1 f e e s i n c u r r e d i n t h i s 
m a t t e r . 
13 . The Dec ree of D i v o r c e i s s u e d s h a l l become a b s o l u t e 
and f i n a l upon i t s e n t r y by t h e C l e r k of t h e C o u r t i n t h e 
R e g i s t e r of A c t i o n , 
DATED t h i s (S*~ day of / H - / 7 / V ' / 1 9 8 6 . 
BY THE COURT: 
K// L<^ - f l / K ^ /. 'Z.t,<^<kUdLjy\. 
RICHARD C. DAVIDSON 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On t h e 8 t h d a y of A p r i l , 1 9 8 6 , I h e r e b y m a i l e d a t r u e 
and c o r r e c t c o p y of t h e a b o v e and f o r e g o i n g DECREE OF 
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DIVORCE by depositing the same in the Unit 
postage prepaidf to the following: 
George E. Mangan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
47 North Second East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
A. Lamar Hansen 
Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 257 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I personally mailed four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following, postage prepaid. 
John E. Schindler 
Attorney for Respondent 
Oliveto Building, Suite 7 
23 South Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
DATE: Octobe xHL 1986. 
Randall J. Holmgren 
